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Neutral Standardizing of Contracts
Joseph M. Perillo*
We are surrounded by standardized products. Standard
computer compact disks (CDs) fit into computers manufactured
by HP, Apple, Dell, Lenovo, Sony, Toshiba and probably all
other new computers. Standard diskettes fit into an earlier
generation of computers. This compatibility between diskettes,
CDs and computers is not accidental. These compatibilities are
the result of the collaborative deliberations of members of a
standard-setting organization. Many similar standards are the
product of the collaborative efforts of members of thousands of
standard-setting organizations. The Institute of Electrical Elec-
tronics Engineers ("IEEE-SA") is one of these organizations
that sets standards for the manufacture and operation of com-
puters and computer-related functions.1 Organizations such as
* Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, Fordham University School of
Law.
1. The IEEE-SA describes itself as follows:
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association
(IEEE-SA) is the leading developer of global industry standards in a broad-
range of industries, including:
" Power and Energy
" Biomedical and Healthcare
* Information Technology
" Telecommunications
" Transportation
" Nanotechnology
" Information Assurance
For over a century, the IEEE-SA has offered an established standards devel-
opment program that features balance, openness, due process, and
consensus.
IEEE Standards Association, Overview, http://standards.ieee.org/sa/sa-view.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
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IEEE-SA meet with relative freedom from the constraints of the
antitrust laws.2 Many of these standard-setting organizations
are multinational. 3 Suppose in New York you pick up a tele-
phone manufactured by AT&T or any one of the one hundred or
so telephone manufacturers. It is no accident that if you punch
in the telephone number of someone in Kazakhstan, the phone
will ring in Kazakhstan. The ringtone may be unfamiliar, but
hundreds of standards developed by the telephone industry
help ensure that it will ring.4 When the person you called picks
up the telephone he or she can hear your voice. Multiple inter-
nationally recognized standards assure these results. Indeed,
JEDEC is another standard-setting committee that impacts information tech-
nology. Its home page describes the committee in the following terms:
JEDEC is the leading developer of standards for the solid-state industry.
Almost 3100 participants, appointed by some 290 companies work together
in 50 JEDEC committees to meet the needs of every segment of the indus-
try, manufacturers and consumers alike. The publications and standards
that they generate are accepted throughout the world. All JEDEC stan-
dards are available online, at no charge.
JEDEC, http://www.jedec.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). Upon visiting the web
site, I was invited to join.
2. There is ample literature. Among the most recent are Michael Betts,
Standardization in Information Technology Industries: Emerging Issues Under
Section Two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 34 (2007);
Michael Betts, Plunging into the Information Age: The Effect of Current Competi-
tion Policy on United States Science and Technology Policy, 3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH.
33 (2007); M. Sean Royall, Standard Setting and Exclusionary Conduct: The Role
of Antitrust in Policing Unilateral Abuses of Standard-Setting Processes, 18 ANTI-
TRUST 44 (2004); Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting
Organizations: A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDozo L. REV.
1393 (2004); David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Anti-
trust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913 (2003).
3. See NILS BRUSSON & BENGT JACOBSON AND ASSOCIATES, A WORLD OF STAN-
DARDS (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
4. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488-89 (1998).
Telephones and fax machines are classic examples of actual network goods;
owning the only telephone or fax machine in the world would be of little
benefit because it could not be used to communicate with anyone. The value
of the telephone or fax machine one has already purchased increases with
each additional purchaser, so long as all machines operate on the same stan-
dards and the network infrastructure is capable of processing all member
communications reliably.
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there are said to be "over 100 private and public entities in-
volved in standard-setting in the telecommunications area."5
Standardization, however, is not always a product of collab-
orative organizational decisions. Sometimes standards are set
by an early entry into the market. The so-called QWERTY key-
board is not ideal but was created by Christopher Latham
Sholes, one of several inventors of the typewriter. A typewriter
with the QWERTY keyboard, manufactured and marketed by
the Remington Arms Company, dominated the market and be-
came the standard. The typewriter and computer keyboards we
know today, with minor variations, are clones of the original.6
Although more efficient keyboards have been devised, no com-
petitor of Remington or its successor market leaders ever made
more than a dent in the prevalence of the QWERTY keyboard.
Despite its inefficiencies, no more efficient keyboard seems
likely to supplant it today.
Standards are sometimes set by the strongest of several ad-
versaries in the market. VHS became the standard video cas-
sette only after a bitter Darwinian marketplace battle with a
competitive system marketed by Betamax.7 Only VHS sur-
vived. A similar struggle is now in progress between Samsung,
Pioneer and Sony, the backers of Blu-Ray discs, as allies
against Toshiba, Intel and Microsoft, the backers of HD-DVD.
Both products are hawked as replacements for the DVD.8
Sometimes the federal government will set a standard, as
was the case with digital television.9 However, the administra-
tion of Bill Clinton sought to remove the government from stan-
5. Kathleen M. H. Wallman, The Role of Government in Telecommunications
Standard-Setting, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 235, 235 n.2 (2000).
6. Sholes was the first of several inventors of a typewriter to market his in-
vention successfully. For the history of the invention and diffusion of the standard
English language keyboard developed by Sholes, see Consider QWERTY, http:/!
home.earthlink.net/-dcrehr/whyqwert.html (last visited on Feb. 7, 2008).
7. "[Mlanufacturers divided themselves into two camps: On the Betamax side
were Sony, Toshiba, Sanyo, NEC, Aiwa and Pioneer. On the VHS side were JVC,
Matsushita (Panasonic), Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Sharp, and Akai." Media Col-
lege.com, The Betamax vs. VHS Format War, http://www.mediacollege.comlvideo/
format/comparelbetamax-vhs.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
8. See Dan Costa, Blue-Ray v. HD-DVD: What You Need to Know, PC MAGA-
zINE ONLINE, June 28, 2006, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1982533,00.
asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
9. See JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: How BROADCASTERS LURED THE Gov-
ERNMENT INTO INCITING A REVOLUTION IN TELEVISION (Harcourt & Brace Co. 1998).
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dard-setting, saying that "the marketplace, not governments,
should determine technical standards .... ,,0o In the implemen-
tation of this philosophy, legislation was enacted to give prefer-
ence to voluntary standards set by industry as alternatives to
governmental mandatory standards.1' Yet, current daily news-
paper accounts describe the efforts of the Grocery Manufactur-
ers Association to induce the Food and Drug Administration to
set a new and arguably debased standard for what constitutes
chocolate. 12
This has been a brief review of some of the principal stan-
dard-setting mechanisms. There are others. 13
What has any of this discussion of product standardization
have to do with standard form contracts? Uncounted word-
processing toner cartridges have been emptied in writing about
the problems presented by standard contract forms. "Standard
forms dominate both the consumer and the business environ-
ment so that only contracts that are sufficiently large, compli-
cated, or idiosyncratic enough to justify negotiation over more
than the basic terms of quantity, price, and delivery satisfy the
meeting of the minds standard that underlies traditional no-
tions of consent."' 4 The drafting of standard forms by national
enterprises has properly been described as "unilateral private
ordering of terms imposed by the dominant party"15 and has
been denounced by a prominent scholar as the equivalent of leg-
10. Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745, 745 n.2 (1999) (quoting Wil-
liam J. Clinton & Albert A. Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electric Commerce
§ 9 (1997), available at http://www.itmweb.com/essay541.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2008)).
11. See, e.g., Elliott Klayman, Comment, Standard Setting under the Con-
sumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981-A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 96 (1982).
12. Mort Rosenblum, Chocolate Fake, N.Y. TiMEs, June 25, 2007, at A19.
13. A more thorough canvas of standard-setting mechanisms appears in Kath-
leen M.H. Wallman, The Role of Government in Telecommunications Standard-
Setting, 8 COMMLAW CONSPEcTus 235 (2000).
14. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts As an Agency Problem, 2004 Wisc.
L. REV. 679, 679.
15. Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels? Article 2A Standardized Rental Car Terms,
Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 LoYoLA L.A. L. REV. 137,
138 (2006). Another attempted classification of boilerplate terms is "terms of use,"
as applied to software licenses. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MiN. L. REV.
459, 460 (2006).
[Vol. 28:179
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islation by the likes of unelected credit card issuers and other
firms that present standard forms to consumers on a take-it-or-
leave it basis. 16 Many standard forms contain terms that are
heavily weighted towards the propounder's interests.'7 Even
where the standard form is not unduly weighted in favor of the
propounder, like the QWERTY keyboard, the form is unlikely to
adequately take into account the interests of the consumer.
Despite scholarly concentration on the topic, "[t]he problem
of mass-produced contracts of adhesion was a Twentieth Cen-
tury problem for contract law, which Twentieth Century con-
tract law never really solved." 8 A twenty-first century solution
is needed. The problem stems from the adversarial nature of
the way those of us who write about contract law enshrine as
the model of contract formation. The model assumes that adult
participants in the marketplace negotiate, haggle over and for-
mulate a contract that takes into account the interests of both
parties. This type of contract formation no longer reflects the
formation of the typical consumer contract. Instead, the drafter
of standard form consumer contracts uses the adversarial model
to produce form contracts that take into account only the inter-
16. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); see also Stephen J. Choi & G.
Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1139-42 (2006) (making
the point that standard forms ought to be interpreted as if they were statutes).
Slawson's proposed solution to the problem of unfair terms in consumer contracts
is put forward in W. David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to
Prevent Deceptive Contracting by Standard Form, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853. An-
other, but idiosyncratic, look at contracts as private lawmaking is David V. Sny-
der, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 371 (2003) (noting that only megalateral
contracts--to which thousands or millions of parties assent"-qualify as
lawmaking).
17. See, e.g., Eric Andrew Horwitz, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provi-
sions as Used in Consumer Service Contracts of Adhesion, 15 U. MIAMI Bus. L.
REV. 75 (2006). As to unfair terms in shrinkwrap and clickwrap licensing con-
tracts, see Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User's Guide to EULAS, http'J/
www.eff.orglwp/eula.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). It has been noted that busi-
nesses frequently do not enforce onerous terms against high value, honest consum-
ers. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and
Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006). Much the same point is made in Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006).
18. Charles Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scru-
tiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 95, 135 (2006).
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ests of the propounding party. These lawyer-drafted forms
often go well beyond what the client needs or wants.19
Not much ink has been applied to the question of how to
draft standardized form contracts entered into by consumers so
that they are not loaded with terms that are unduly favorable to
the drafting party. Numerous neutral standard forms, devel-
oped by organizations, are currently employed by business law-
yers and businesses for transactions between businesses. 20
Unfortunately, consumers have not benefited from this process.
To take a more or less arcane example of neutral standard-
form drafting, the International Swap and Derivatives Associa-
tion ("ISDA") provides a boilerplate Master Agreement which
contains the non-financial terms of the transaction. The ISDA
also publishes an array of booklets containing definitions, rid-
ers, confirmation forms and a user's guide explaining the use of
these documents, as well as detailing standardized variations of
the Master Contract. 21 The ISDA membership of 815 institu-
tions consists of leading financial institutions, various end-
users of derivatives and premier law firms.22 Its members come
from every continent. The drafting of boilerplate terms by such
a diverse group helps ensure that the concerns of most stake-
holders will be taken into account. The model by which it is cre-
ated is a participatory, collaborative effort by its stakeholders
rather than an adversarial clash as was the clash between VHS
and Betamax. Careful legal advice helps such an organization
stay clear of committing antitrust violations. 23
19. A notorious example is the form used in Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Orange Crush Co., 289 F. 693 (5th Cir. 1926), purporting to give the plaintiff per-
petual rights with the option to cancel at will. It was void for want of
consideration.
20. This is not surprising. Many observers have commented on the utility of
standard forms. E.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Recon-
struction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1174, 1221 (1983) (noting that standard form contracts
lower administrative and transactional costs, helping to avoid damages and liabil-
ity); M. J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-
Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 359, 364 (1976)
(stating that standard form contracts reduce the costs of transactions and promote
efficiency in the conduct of trade).
21. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., http://
www.isda.org (last visited on Feb. 11, 2008).
22. Id. (click "membership") (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
23. See Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, to Ken-
neth P. Ewing, Counsel for the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (Aug. 10,
184 [Vol. 28:179
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In a similar collaborative effort, the North American En-
ergy Standards Board has hammered out a document known as
"General Terms and Conditions, Base Contract for Sale and
Purchase of Natural Gas."24 The North American Energy Stan-
dards Board is an organization under the aegis of
ANSI-American National Standards Institute-the most im-
portant North American umbrella organization to which stan-
dard-setting committees are responsible.
It is well known that the non-financial terms of trust inden-
tures rarely depart from boilerplate.25 Even where negotiated
terms supplement the boilerplate, standard variations have
been published for adoption.26 The use of these boilerplate
terms promotes efficiency by drastically reducing transaction
costs and creates a high degree of certainty. 27 Complex deals
are simplified and the parties have a high degree of assurance
that they know their rights and obligations and that the courts
will effectuate their understanding. 28
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/217742.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2008). I am indebted to Professor Mark Patterson for this
reference.
24. Calpine Corp. v. Bank of New York, 895 A.2d 880, 882 (Del. Ch. 2005),
affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom Wilmington Trust Co. v. Calpine Corp., No. 602,
2005 Del. LEXIS 520 (Del. Dec. 16, 2005) (discussing the use of NAESB Standard
6.3.1). For an analysis, see Karen Goepfert, For the Long Haul: The Suitability of
the Base Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Natural Gas for Long-Term Trans-
actions, 27 ENERGY L.J. 583 (2006). This standard form and several others are
available for purchase at American National Standards Institute eStandards
Store, http://webstore.ansi.org/ansidocstore/dept.asp?deptid=3114 (last visited
Feb. 11, 2008).
25. For a brief history of the development and modifications of this boiler-
plate, see Committee on Trust Indentures and Indenture Trustees, ABA Section of
Business Law, Model Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions, 61 Bus. LAW.
1439, 1439-40 (2006).
26. Id.
27. But see Tina L. Stark, Address at the Fifth Annual Business Law Sympo-
sium, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education: Those Boilerplate Pro-
visions at the End of the Contract-Fine Print, Big Deal (Nov. 2003) (warning
against the unthinking adoption of boilerplate).
28. In U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. Alpert, 10 F. Supp. 2d 290, 305 (S.D.N.Y.
1998), affd, 168 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999), the court referred to boilerplate Trust
Indenture terms using the language:
There is no dispute herein that the provisions of the Trusts' Indentures re-
lating to record dates and distributions are basically standard, 'boilerplate'
provisions for these instruments. Uniformity of interpretation of such provi-
sions is essential to the efficiency of the markets. See Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982); Broad v.
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Along with the collaborative model, there is the paternalis-
tic model of crafting neutral form contracts. Best known are the
standard forms published by the American Institute of Archi-
tects ("AIA"). With the possible exception of the form for the
retaining of an architect, these forms are designed to take into
account and balance the interests of all stakeholders. Since
they have been refined and updated since 1888, the drafters
have interactively taken into consideration numerous court de-
cisions and problems that have emerged over the course of a
century. Approximately one hundred AA forms have been de-
veloped. According to one analysis, "the case for [AIA] form con-
tracts for construction is an example of how markets, as
opposed to private negotiation, can be used to determine effi-
cient contract terms."29 I call this the paternalistic model; the
paternity of the contract is the market as perceived by the AIA.
Another model for the formulation of neutral standard form
contracts is the collective bargain. Standard forms are some-
times negotiated between potentially adversary organizations.
The resulting collaborative standard form is comparable to a
collective bargaining agreement between labor and manage-
ment. A reported case informs us that
[t]he 1988 Hospital Agreement... was a standard form of Hospi-
tal Agreement for hospitals.., within the Philadelphia region. It
was negotiated by Blue Cross with a trade association known as
the Delaware Valley Hospital Counsel ("DVHC"), but each hospi-
tal member of DVHC then negotiated its own separate per diem
rates with Blue Cross. 30
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1981). I think it fair to
assume that, if this court were to award these settlement proceeds to the
Former Holders out of their theory of 'equity' rather than apply the direc-
tives of the language of the Indentures, it would send shock waves to the
markets.
Id.
29. Surajeet Chakravarty & W. Bentley MacLeod, On the Efficiency of Stan-
dard Form Contracts: The Case of Construction (University of Southern California
Law and Economics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 17, 2004), available at http://
law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/artl7 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
30. Taylor Hosp. Corp. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, No. 923,
2001WL 1807882 (Pa. Com. P1. Apr. 23, 2001).
186 [Vol. 28:179
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But note that the standard form was developed by negotia-
tion between two organizations that had relatively equal bar-
gaining power.
Where neutral standard forms formulated by the collabora-
tive, paternalistic or collective bargain model often employed in
commercial business-to-business contexts exist, a party's at-
tempt to introduce deviations from the standardized language
generally meets great resistance. This resistance is typically
fueled by inertia or suspicion that the party seeking the devia-
tion is out to trick the resisting party.31
Another kind of neutral standard form for business to busi-
ness transactions is the Model Agreement. 32 These vary from
routine standard forms and are more likely to receive tailor-
made deviations. Model Agreements are designed to simplify
the work of the drafter and call attention to terms that might
have been overlooked by drafters of a tailor-made agreement.
(Of course, law firms that frequently deal with, say, mergers
and acquisitions have their own model forms.) Still more re-
mote from the more rigid intra business forms are bar associa-
tion texts that are guides for lawyers in drafting tailor-made
agreements. 33
Consumers are notably absent from most of the standard-
form drafting organizations. Judge Posner, not generally known
for championing consumers, but known for his faith in market-
place competition, makes this surprising statement:
31. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 680-87 (2006).
It is sometimes cheap and desirable to offer terms that differ from the de-
fault rules or the standard terms used in the market. But the proposal of
new and otherwise unfamiliar terms may also raise suspicions and scare
away potential counterparties. Default rules and the standard boilerplate
terms may stick more than we think, and more than they should.
Id. at 687.
32. The ABA's Business Law Section has produced a number of such model
agreements. E.g., ABA Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions, Model Joint Ven-
ture Agreement with Commentary (2006); ABA Committee on Negotiated Acquisi-
tions, Model Asset Purchase Agreement with Commentary (2001).
33. E.g., The ABA's Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions, The M & A Pro-
cess: A Practical Guide for the Business Lawyer (2005). A more thorough canvas of
non-profit organizations that draft form contracts can be found in Kevin E. Davis,
The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MIcH. L. REV. 1075
(2006).
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[Florm contracts used in transactions with consumers tend to be
one-sided because they are drafted by firms, trade associations, or
professional associations, which want such contracts to be slanted
in their favor .... To my suggestion that form contracts used in
consumer transactions tend to be one-sided it may be objected
that competition can be relied upon to yield the optimal form. But
that is doubtful.34
After making these remarks, he proceeds to defend what to
some is indefensible-the use by firms of "bad," that is con-
sumer-unfriendly, form contracts. 35
What can be done to assure that a standard take-it-or-
leave-it form to which a consumer must adhere takes into ac-
count the consumer's interests? One answer might be consumer
protection legislation. At times such legislation dictates that a
contract must contain certain terms. Insurance legislation is
one illustration of legislation that mandates certain terms for
protection of the consumer.
For example, New York's insurance law requires that life
insurance policies "shall contain in substance the following pro-
visions, or provisions which the superintendent deems to be
more favorable to policyholders." 36 Similar statutes have been
enacted in many other States.37 These provisions include such
insured-friendly terms as a thirty-one-day grace period 38 and a
two-year incontestable clause, 39 and insurer-friendly terms
such as a strict integration clause. 40 The insured may not waive
or contract away terms that are for the protection of the insured
under this statute and its cognate statutes in other states.41
Thus, such statutes compel partial form requirements. They
34. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEx. L. REV. 1581, 1585-86 (2005).
35. Id.
36. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(a) (McKinney 2007).
37. LEE R. Russ & THoMAs F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 17.12 (3d ed.
2005) [hereinafter "COUCH"].
38. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(a)(1).
39. Id. § 3203(a)(3).
40. Id. § 3203(a)(4).
41. COUCH, supra note 37, at § 19:1; H.D. Warren, Theory of Waiver as Appli-
cable Where Provisions of Policy or Acts of Insurer Are Inconsistent with Statutory
Requirements, 9 A.L.R.2d 1436. The National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners ("NAIC) has developed some uniformity of state standards for policy provi-
sions. Most recently, the NAIC was instrumental in creating a standard-setting
organization, the Interstate Insurance Product Regulatory Commission ("IIPRC").
[Vol. 28:179188
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dictate particular provisions to be included in the policy unless
more favorable terms are offered to the insured. Indeed, if the
policy does not expressly contain a mandated term, it is none-
theless integrated into the contract. "Existing and valid statu-
tory provisions enter into and form a part of all contracts of
insurance to which they are applicable, and, together with set-
tled judicial constructions thereof, become a part of the contract
as much as if they were actually incorporated therein."42 De-
spite the mandating of several terms of an insurance policy,
such legislation is uncommon and possibly incomplete as no
standard insurance policy is mandated or suggested. This also
helps explain the enormous percentage of cases concerning the
interpretation of insurance policies that bulk-up the advance
sheets.
Legislation can determine the content of a standard form.
Whether such legislation would be wise is another question.
Jeremy Bentham proposed that for each species of contract, "let
a distinct species of paper be provided."43 Thus "farm lease pa-
per" would be a different legislated form than "house lease pa-
per" and "lodging-lease paper," etc.4 The use of these forms
would be mandatory, a requirement which would be widely pub-
licized by the state. Each would contain an essay on the law
governing the kind of transaction for which it was drafted.45
The New York legislature has done this in a small way as to
a relatively non-controversial context-powers of attorney. The
legislature in 1948 created a statutory short form power of at-
torney and also twelve sections of the law defining and constru-
ing the contents of the statutory short form. 46 For example, if
the principal checks off on the form that he or she authorizes
By an interstate compact among thirty states, it began in 2007 to undertake stan-
dard setting for various insurance products.
42. COUCH, supra note 37, at § 19:1.
43. Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and
Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 51 (1974) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, bk 4, ch. 3, § 2 (1843)).
44. Id. (citing BENTHAM, supra note 43).
45. Id. (citing BENTHAM, supra note 43).
46. Currently the statutory form is found in New York Real Property Law
section 5-1501. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 5-1501 (McKinney 2007). It was enacted
by the Laws of 1948 c. 422, at the suggestion of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission. The report urging enactment was written by Professor Richard R. Powell
of Columbia. N.Y. Leg. Doc. 65(L) (1946). He found a precedent for such legisla-
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
the agent to engage in "real estate transactions," current Gen-
eral Obligations Law section 5-1502A describes in detail the
kinds of transactions which the agent may bind the principal.47
Eleven other articles do the same for other tasks the agent has
been authorized to perform. 48
In more controversial areas, such as the landlord-tenant re-
lationship, the content of a software license or of the rental of
an automobile, one may question whether a legislature is an apt
entity for the creation of mandated or suggested standard
forms. There are reasons to think that it may not be the ideal
organ for this purpose. For one thing, legislatures are intensely
political. For example, if a legislature were to propose or man-
date the terms of a residential lease, it could very well be heav-
ily skewed towards the terms propounded for lobbyists for
landlords or for tenants. In addition, legislatures are very
much under the control of the powers of inertia. Once a form
has been legislated, it will often be exceedingly difficult to rec-
tify mistakes or to update the form to take into account changes
to which the market would react.
Attempts to protect consumers in the drafting of standard
forms have varied. Close to a consumer transaction is the
purchase of residential real estate. In some states, buyers and
sellers are routinely represented by counsel. However, in many
states, residential property is routinely contracted to be sold
without the assistance of counsel. Procedures vary from state
to state. In New York, lawyers are almost always involved in
the preparation of the contract and they also preside over the
closing. 49 We are told that in North Carolina, "[t]he majority of
residential sales contracts are written by real estate agents us-
ing standard forms provided by the North Carolina Association
of Realtors. These 'fill in the blanks' forms were developed by
tion in what is now New York Real Property Law section 254, which had defined
certain terms used in deeds of conveyance. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAw § 254.
47. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1502A.
48. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 5-1502B(4)-5-1502L.
49. In New York, brokers are deterred from participating in the drafting of
contracts by Judiciary Law section 484, with respect to the unauthorized practice
of law, and New York Real Property Law section 41-c, with respect to revocation
and suspension of licenses. See Formal Opinion No. 96-Fll, 1996 N.Y. Op. Att'y
Gen. 46 (1966).
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attorneys and comply with our [North Carolina] state laws."50
While in North Carolina the contracts are typically prepared by
real estate brokers using standard forms, the closing is rou-
tinely handled by lawyers. 51 Thus, whether one looks to the
New York paradigm or the North Carolina system, the home
buyer and seller receive the protection of lawyers or lawyer-
drafted forms that are intended to take into account the inter-
ests of buyers and sellers.
The California Association of Realtors "develops and pub-
lishes standard forms and publications for use and reference by
the real estate industry."5 2 Another organization, the Air Com-
mercial Real Estate Association ("AIR"), also publishes forms
for use in California. The Association states that "[o]ver 40 dif-
ferent contract forms published by AIR are distinguished by the
fact that they are continually refined and updated by a team of
brokers, real estate attorneys, property managers and other
commercial real estate professionals." 53 If this statement is ac-
curate we will once again see neutral contract forms standard-
ized by a group in which most stakeholders are represented.
Tenants are not among those represented. Residential tenants
are comparable to the consumers in that they are not routinely
represented in the organizations that develop standard real es-
tate transaction standardized forms.
Colorado gets further than most states. Standard real es-
tate forms are approved by the Colorado Real Estate Commis-
sion, a state licensing and regulatory agency. Approved
contract forms are posted on the internet. According to the
Commission's web site, parties and their attorneys are permit-
ted to draft variations from the standard forms, but brokers
50. Janet Wickell, Typical Real Estate Closing Procedures in North Carolina,
http://homebuying.about.com/od/escrowandclosing/a/ncclosings.htm (last visited
Feb. 11, 2008).
51. Id.
52. Manderville v. PCG & S Group, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 63 (2007) (quot-
ing 2 Miller & Starr, Cal.Real Estate § 4:62, pp 201-02 (3d ed. 2000)); see also
Tyquiengco v. California Ass'n of Realtors, A106730, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 6104 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 2005) (noting, "CAR is a trade association of
real estate brokers in this state. It drafts, prints and distributes to its brokers a
preprinted 'California Residential Purchase Agreement and Joint Escrow Instruc-
tions' form").
53. AIR Commercial Real Estate Association, About WinAir Forms 2.0, http://
www.airea.com/FORMS/AboutWinAIRForms.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
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cannot deviate from the approved forms and cannot assist the
parties in drafting contracts except by using the approved
forms.5 4
Courts can sometimes do justice for a consumer who has
adhered to a standard-form contract that reeks with an unjust
term. There are doctrines, such as unconscionability and contra
proferenten, that may be applied. Court relief, however, is spo-
radic, costly and difficult to predict. In the words of the New
Jersey Law Revision Commission,
[t]he doctrines of 'unconscionability' and 'contract of adhesion' re-
strict a court's ability to handle the diversity of standard form
contract terms by creating simplistic legal categories that do not
reflect commercial reality. A court's ability to deal with problems
posed by standard form contracts is restricted by common law
doctrines.55
The bottom line of this excursion into standards and stan-
dard-form contracts is that consumers have little to say about
the content of the standard forms to which they adhere, and
government help is sporadic at best. There is limited govern-
mental protection as to the content of those forms. Consumer
protection organizations have not, to the best of my knowledge,
intervened in the drafting of form contracts, although they have
lobbied for legislative protections, sometimes successfully.
Courts and administrative agencies have pitched in to help con-
sumers. Nevertheless, the drafters of standard forms have very
little to restrain their despotic powers to dictate all but the cen-
tral aspects of mass-market transactions.
Is there a solution? I will propose a partial resolution of the
consumer's plight. In an address to the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Benjamin Cardozo, then New York's
Chief Judge, proposed the establishment of a Ministry of Jus-
tice.56 The opening paragraph of the address was a plea for leg-
54. Department of Regulatory Agencies: Division of Real Estate, http:fl
www.dora.state.co.us/real-estate/consumer/contracts.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2008).
55. New Jersey Law Revision Commission, Final Report Relating to Standard
Form Contracts (October 1998) http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/index/alpha-
pagel.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
56. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 45 HARv. L. REV. 113 (1921),
reprinted in BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAw AND LITERATURE 41 (1931) [hereinafter
CARDOZO, LAw AND LITERATURE].
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islative improvement of the law. Indeed, the entire lecture was
centered on legislation. Legislators needed to act "without ex-
pert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice." 57 A
ministry of justice would fill in these gaps.
The address helped spawn two institutions-the American
Law Institute and the New York Law Revision Commission. 58 I
will focus on the first, the American Law Institute ("ALI").
While Cardozo's initial plea was for help by legislation, the ALI
instead focused on the improvement of the common law by re-
stating it. 59 Cardozo, who was the ALI's initial vice-president,
approved of the goal of restating the common law. He did this
by signing onto the first annual report that described what be-
came the methodology of the Restatements 60 and in his address
to the third annual meeting of the ALI. 61 Both the report and
the address demonstrate Cardozo's flexibility. He had sug-
gested improvement of the law by legislation, but settled for im-
provement by the Restatements. The ALI's flexibility is shown
by its later work on legislation, such as the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and the Model Codes.62 My proposal is simply that
the ALI take its hand at the drafting of commonly used stan-
dard forms for consumer transactions after receiving input from
all stakeholders -involved in the transaction-type. The ALI is a
unique and flexible organization. It can bring together business
leaders and consumer activists and their lawyers for a collabo-
rative effort to craft hard-headed but fair standard forms.
Would firms adopt the standard forms promulgated by the
ALI or any other impartial organization? What incentive would
57. Id. at 42.
58. In Simpson v. Loehmmann, 234 N.E.2d 669 (N.Y. 1967), the court noted
the relationship between Cardozo's address and the foundation of the Law Revi-
sion Commission.
59. The arguments that led to the ALI's rejection of legislation are discussed
in G. Edward White, The American Law Institute an the Triumph of Modernist
Jurisprudence, 15 LAw & HIST. REv. 1, 12-13 (1997).
60. ALI, 1923 Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent
Organization for Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an Amer-
ican Law Institute (1923), reprinted in ALI, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH
ANNIvERSARY 1 (1973). Cardozo was one of the Report's reporters, along with Jo-
seph H. Beale, William Draper Lewis and Samuel Williston. Id at vii.
61. CARDOZO, LAw AND LITERATURE, supra note 56, at 121.
62. Speculation at the motives behind the ALI's incursion into legislation is
provided in White, supra note 59, at 46.
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they have to adopt a form contract that lessens their power to
dictate the terms of the contract? From the consumer's point of
view, an ALI approved form would act like the Good House-
keeping "Seal of Approval" or the Underwriter's Laboratories
certification. "These are just a few examples of the ratings or-
ganizations that operate in the economy today-all of which
emerged to fill an informational need and survive on the basis
of their reputations."63 The consumer will be assured that the
form is of high quality and their interests have been taken into
account. 64 From the point of view of the firm that propounds
the form, an ALI endorsed form would have reputational bene-
fits. Just as firms seek, at some cost, to obtain the certification
from Good Housekeeping or Underwriter's Laboratory, they
may be impelled by competitive pressures to utilize and adver-
tise their use of an ALI form. Adoption of such forms will help
avoid state requirements that could vary from state to state and
would help to forestall lawsuits.65 Moreover, if Avis trumpets
its adoption of an ALI form, will Hertz be far behind?66
63. Id.
64. Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law
and Economics of Regulating Ratings Firms, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 49, 82
n.156 (2007).
65. Similar concerns have impelled various business groups to seek federal
regulation of such things as hazardous flames from cigarette lighters. Eric Lipton
& Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2007 at 1.
66. When this article was substantially completed, a somewhat similar propo-
sal was published by Samuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism:
Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law (Sep. 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015736 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). Becher
proposes a new entity to approve or disapprove of contract forms, in some in-
stances backed up by law. In an earlier paper it was suggested that a limited
number of forms be subjected to an administrative pre-approval process. Clayton
P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 Hous. L. REV. 975
(2005).
[Vol. 28:179194
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss2/2
